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The Editorial on the Research Topic
Dishonest Behavior, from Theory to Practice
The rapidly growing field of behavioral ethics has shown that dishonest acts are highly prevalent in
all walks of life, from corruption among politicians to flagrant cases of doping in sports, to everyday
slips, and misdemeanors by ordinary people who nevertheless perceive themselves as highly moral.
For instance, managers exaggerate travel expenses, consumers engage in wardrobing, citizens evade
taxes, or download illegal music. When considered cumulatively, these seemingly innocuous and
ordinary unethical behaviors cause considerable societal damage and add up to billions of dollars
annually (Ariely, 2012).
Recent works in the behavioral ethics field have made tremendous advances in understanding
the roots of dishonesty and characterizing the contextual and social factors that promote or
hinder it. For example, one of the main insights is that people value morality and try to resist
the temptation to act dishonestly (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011).
Investigations of misconduct in real life and in laboratory experiments indicate that while most
people act dishonestly in everyday life, their dishonest acts are usually far below the maximum
possible (Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011). According to the Self-Maintenance
model of dishonesty, this is due to ethical dissonance (Ayal and Gino, 2011; Barkan et al., 2012), a
psychological tension which stems from the conflict between the desire to benefit from unethical
behavior and the motivation to maintain a positive moral image (Barkan et al., 2015; Hochman
et al., 2016).
The current research topic aims to utilize these lines of work to shift research in behavioral
ethics from a descriptive approach to a more prescriptive and applicable one, thus advancing
theoretical knowledge and making it possible to implement the findings to design and test practical
interventions to promote ethical conduct among individuals in their day to day lives.
The first section explores the processes underlying dishonesty and highlights the interplay
betweenmoral self-image (MSI) and dishonesty. The second section shedsmore light on contextual
factors that promote or hinder dishonesty, with special attention to the perceived reasons and
consequences of behavior. The last two sections emphasize the role of social and cultural norms
both in the form of dishonesty as well as in effective interventions to reduce it.
MORAL SELF-IMAGE AND DISHONESTY
Several works examine the interplay between peoples’ MSI and dishonest behavior. Jordan et al.
aim to capture the fluctuations and malleability of the moral self in that people perceive themselves
as highly moral, but engage routinely in unethical behavior. The paper defines the construct of MSI
and presents an assessment questionnaire for moral self-perception in a current state. Liang et al.
test how self-esteem affects the intention to engage in corrupt behavior. They show that increased
self-esteem causes a low level of materialism, which in turn decreases corrupt intention.
Ayal et al. Editorial: Dishonest Behavior, from Theory to Practice
In a similar vein, Ding et al. delve deeper into the dynamics
of MSI by examining the functions of guilt and moral identity in
motivating prosocial behavior. They show that the link between
acting immorally and compensatory behavior is mediated by guilt
and moderated by moral identity (for related “moral accounting”
models see Sachdeva et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2014). Merzel et al.
show that people who acted dishonestly in the past are ready to
suffer a future loss rather than admitting, even implicitly, that
they lied. Chance et al. however show that this self-deception
will decay if individuals are exposed to unbiased feedback about
their true ability, but can be quickly revived if they get a new
opportunity to cheat.
The last paper in this section (Burgoon) challenges the
fundamental assumption that lying requires more effort than
truth-telling. The paper discusses communication factors that
may moderate the cognitive effort associated with producing
deceptive messages.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTE
OR INHIBIT DISHONESTY
One way to resolve the tension between dishonest behavior
and MSI is to creatively interpret an incriminating behavior
as an honest or acceptable one (Mazar et al., 2008; Barkan
et al., 2015). As a result, the magnitude of dishonesty is highly
sensitive to contextual factors that affect our ability to justify
unethicality (Shalvi et al., 2015; Hochman et al., 2016). Applying
these insights, Rilke et al. show that self-reporting work hours
dishonestly can be reduced by moving from a one-by-one to
an all-at-once reporting policy. Van Der Zee et al. reported that
negative emotional responses in an online settings (i.e., rejection)
leads to increased dishonest behavior. By contrast, Lang et al.
found that religious music can be used as a subtle cue associated
with moral standards to curb dishonest behavior, but this mainly
affects religious participants. Finally, themagnitude of dishonesty
is also sensitive to the perceived identity of its victims. Amir
et al. suggested that people are more willing to cheat groups
than individuals, but only when the harm to the group is stated
in global terms. In this context the lack of information about
the harm caused to each individual can be used as a pretext for
cheating.
CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN
DISHONEST BEHAVIOR
Social and cultural norms play a key role in shaping moral
behavior (e.g., Cialdini, 1993; Haidt and Joseph, 2004). In
a study on cross-cultural differences in tax evasion between
Italy and Sweden, Andrighetto et al. find that even though
average tax compliance is similar in both countries, Italians
were much more likely to fudge their income and Swedes
were more likely to be completely honest or dishonest. Mann
et al. found that legal sanctions and internal factors designed to
deter minor, non-violent crimes have similar effects on different
dishonest acts across five distinct cultures. More specifically, the
results indicated that across countries, internal sanctions had
the strongest deterrent effects on crime. However, the deterrent
effects of legal sanctions were weaker and varied across countries.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: RESEARCH
USING REAL-WORLD SITUATIONS AND
FIELD DATA
This research topic emphasized the applicability of unethical
decision-making research in the real world. Moore and
Pierce combines experimental and field data to examine
how authorities penalize transgressors when the social
context of the transgression elicits expectations of leniency.
A surprising finding suggests that expectations of leniency
(e.g., when the transgressor is caught on his birthday)
appear to elicit psychological reactance and lead to stricter
punishment.
The last two papers in this topic directly investigate
the academic community itself, and speculate how to
foster high ethical standards to improve scientific integrity.
Rajah-Kanagasabai and Roberts show that engagement in
research-related misconduct and questionable research practices
is affected by attitudes, subjective, and descriptive norms about
dishonesty, and mediated by justifications and behavioral
intentions. Similarly, Schoenherr discusses potential practices
(e.g., incentivizing quality rather than quantity of research)
that may solve the problem of inappropriate authorship and
encourage ethical behavior within the research community.
CONCLUSION
Research in the rapidly grown field of behavioral ethics suggests
that public policies and interventions that are based on empirical
research may encourage people to live according to higher ethical
standards (Ariely, 2012; Ayal et al., 2015). The current research
topic presents a wide array of research that contributes directly
to this laudable goal. Taking together, these articles suggest that
dishonest behavior in different forms and cultures share similar
underlying processes. Thus, effective solutions to curb dishonesty
and promote moral behavior in different domains (and across
cultures) should be composed of the same psychological building
blocks.
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